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ABSTRACT
Thispaper deals with the relation between government spendingand real rates
of interest as well as with the international transmission offiscal policies.
The dependence of the patterns of consumption in one country onfiscal policies
in the rest of the world are examined. For this purpose a generalequilibrium
model which is characterized by fully integrated world capital marketsis con-
structed, economic agents behave rationally, and government policies are con-
strained to obey the intertemporal solvency requirements. It is shownthat the
effects of changes •in countries' net debtor position as well as theeffects of
fiscal policies can be analyzed by reference to a multitude of"transfer problems
criteria", which are familiar from the theory of internationaleconomic transfers.
In the present case the impact of policies depends on the relations amongthe
spending patterns of domestic and foreign private sectors;of domestic and foreign
governments, as well as of domestic and foreign saving propensities.
The analysis draws a distinction between permanent and transitory policies
as well as between current policies and expected future policies.A transitory
current fiscal spending, must crowd out the foreign private sector and, thereby,
result in a negative transmission. However, a transitory future rise in govern-
ment spending induces an immediate increase in foreign private sector's consump-
tion and thereby results in a positive current transmission. These responses are
reflected in the current account of the balance—of—payments, in changes in the
net debtor—creditor positions, and in complex changes in the term structure of
interest rates. It is also shown that with full integration of capital markets,
fiscal policies may exert different qualitative effects on real rates of interest
in different countries since, depending on the structural parameters, the relative
prices o.f non—traded goods, and thereby the price indices, might be negatively
correlated between countries.
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One of the major sources of recent friction between Europeans and
Americans has been the interpretation of the economic implications of U.S.
budget deficits. Theorists and policyniakers on both sides of the Atlantic
have differed in the analysis of the role of budget deficits in affecting key
macroeconomic aggregates. Specifically, some have argued that large budget
deficits are responsible for the recently observed high real rates of interest
while others have claimed that budget deficits cannot be blamed for these real
rates. The latter group claimed that theory does not predict a clear—cut
relation between budget deficits and rates of interests and that the empirical
record itself is very weak.
The increased integration of the world economy resulted in increased
concern in each country over policy measures taken in the rest of the world.
The complex pattern of the economic linkages within the interdependent world
economy resulted in avariety of models of the transmission mechanisms. These
models include those that highlight the implications of foreign trade
multipliers, e.g. LINK models which build on a Keynesian structure, as well as
those that highlight the role of the terms of trade along the lines of the—2—
elasticity approach to the balance—of—payments.' In addition, some analyses
have examined whether disturbances can be transmitted negatively to the rest
of the world. For example, Laursen and Metzler have shown that in a model
without capital flows, domestic autonomous government expenditures which raise
domestic output, lower the level of output abroad, i.e. domestic spendings are
transmitted negatively to the rest of the world.2 Parallel to these
developments there were examinations of the transmission mechanism along the
lines of the Mundell—Fieming models.3 These contributions were stimulated
by the increased integration of world capital markets. They highlight the
interdependence between the exchange—rate regimes the degree of capital
mobility and the impact of macroeconomic policies. Here, the key factor in
the transmission mechanism has been the interaction between the rate of
interest and the rate of exchange. Thus, it was shown that in a model with
capital mobility and flexible exchange rates, an expansionary monetary policy
is transmitted negatively to the rest of the world whereas fiscal policy is
transmitted positively. More recently the large volatility of nominal
exchange rates and the associated changes in real exchange rates have
stimulated modelling of exchange—rate dynamics which has focused on the role
of expectations. This line of modelling also relied on the real rate of
interest as a key factor in the transmission mechanism, but the focus on
expectations introduced an important dimension of dynamic considerations.4
These theoretical stuaies were based on the premise that world capital
markets were indeed highly integrated. A separate branch of research has
examined this premise.In this context one line of inquiry tested the
implications of capital market integration for international equality of rates—3—
of return. These studies include tests of equality of real rates of interest
as well as studies of covered interest arbitrage. By and large, the basic
findings were favorable to the flypothesis that capital markets are
integrated.5 A second line of inquiry tested the implications of capital
markets integration for the relation between national saving and national
investment. These studies claimed that the positive correlation between
national saving and investment suggests that the degree of capital market
integration ts somewhat limited.6 While there may be some dispute over the
exact degree of international capital mobility, there is no doubt that the
mobility of capita] serves an important role in linking world rates of
interest and, thereby, in transmitting economic disturbances internationally.
The key issues underlying the international conflict over U.S. budget
deficits and their implications for the state of the world economy have not
yet been fully settled. Specifically, economic theory has not yet resolved
the question of the precise relation between budget deficits and real rates of
interest. Nor has economic theory fully settled the precise nature of the
international transmission of fiscal policies.
This paper is an attempt to shed light on these issues. Specifically, we
develop a model that is suitable for the analysis of (i) the linkage between
fiscal spending and rates of interest, and (ii) the international transmission
mechanism of fiscal policies. Our model is capable of generating a variety of
patterns of links between fiscal spending and rates of interest, as well as a
variety of patterns of international transmissidns of fiscal policies.
The key characteristics of our model are: (flAfully integrated world
capital market; (ii) full rationality of all economic agents whose decisions-4-
are based on self fulfilling expectations and are subjected to temporal and
intertemporal budget constraints, and (iii) government behavior that is
constrained by an intertemporal solvency requirement. The model is of a
general equilibrium nature which implies that the various economies have
access to, and are governed by, world marKets. These markets determine both
temporal prices (commodity terms of trade) and intertemporal prices (rates of
interest) I
Someof the features of the model are (i) the prominent role that is
being played by wealth (permanent income) and the minimal role that is being
played by current income in determining the :levels of private spending; (ii)
the irrelevancy of the time pattern of taxes and government debt issue given
the pattern of government spending and the requirement of intertemporal
solvency8; (iii) the dependence of the current account of the balance of
payments (and thereby the accumulation of national external debt) on the
entire path of government spending rather than on the path of budget
deficits. We show that the impact of fiscal policies and the dynamics of debt
accumulation on the key macroeconomic aggregates at home and abroad depend on
a comparison among various behavioral propensities. These comparisons
generate a multitude of "transfer problem criteria" that are familiar from the
theory of transfers in international trade.9 In the present context the
relevant transfers are among private sectors and government sectors through
current and future taxes and government spendings, as well as between the home
and the foreign countries through the process of accumulation of external
assets and debts. As a result of these transfers the key factors determining
the impacts of policies are comparisons among (i) domestic and foreign—5—
patterns of private sectors' spending, (ii) domestic and foreign private
sectors' saving propensities, and (iii) domestic and foreign patterns of
governments' spending.
The focus on the entire path of the level and composition of government
spending, also serves to highli•gnt the importance of the distinction between
permanent and transitory policies as well as between current and future
policies. These distinctions along with the multitude of the "transfer
problem criteria" are shown to be critical •in accounting for the apparent
ambiguities in the effects of government spending on rates of interest and the
related question of the nature of the international transmission of fiscal
shocks. Our analysis attempts to isolate the roles of these critical factors
in determining the outcomes of fiscal policies:
In addition to providing a theoretical justification for the observed
linkages, our model also has implications for the choice of relevant aggregate
economic variables for empirical research. For example, our analysis has
implications for the expected patterns of the dependence of the reduced form
equations of each country's consumption function, on current and future fiscal
spendings by the domestic as well as by the foreign governments. Similarly,
our analysis has implications for the dependence of the reduced—form equations
of world rates of interest and comodity prices on the paths of fiscal
spendings.
Previous models of the international transmissions of fiscal policies
share some of the features of our model. The novelty of the present analysis
is the integration of these features into a consistent analytical framework.
This integration, however, has not been obtained without cost. At the present
stage our analysis is limited in several important dimensions. The concluding
section of tne paper outlines some of the limitations and suggests possible
extent ions.—6—
II. ONE COMMODITY WOHLD
In this part of the paper we analyze a model of the world economy which
produces and consumes a single composite commodity. We first outline the
analytical framework which is then applied to the analysis of the effects of
fiscal policies on interest rates and the nature of the international
transmission mechanism.
11.1 The Analytical Framework
The analytical framework of the model contains the specification of
production, consumption, the government and the foreign economy which interact
to determine the equilibrium of the world economy.
11.1.1 Production
Consider two countries each producing the same good. Let the path of the
supply of output in each country be fixed at its full employment level.
Denote the supply of output at period t by Vt and
respectively, where an asterisk designates variables pertaining to the foreign
country.
11.1.2 Consumption
Assume that the home country's utility function is logarithmic as in
equation (1)
(1) U = otlogc
where 5 denotes the subjective discount factor and where c denotes the
rate of consumption. The infinitely lived representative individual is
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where denotes taxes at period t, B denotes the one—period debt
and where r denotes the one—period market interest rate. In addition to
the budget constraints in equation (2) there are two additional constraints
which govern the maximization problem. The first states the initial
conditions according to wflich the initial commitment of interest and
amortization (B) is historically given as in equation (3)
(3) B E (1 + r1)81.
The second is the solvency requirement according to which the present value of
debt must approach zero in the limit:
(4) lim ctBt =
t—
whereatdenotesthe present—value factor which is composed of one—period
rates of interest compounded up to period t. Thus:
at(1 +r01(1 + r1F1...(1 ÷—8—
and obviously a0 =1.
Consolidating the set of the budget constraints in (2) and using
equations (3) and (4) yields
(5) =o atct =aY
—aT
—B.
As can be seen, equation (5) is the present value constraint. It states that
the sum of the present values of the rates of consumption in all periods must
equal wealth (W0), where the value of wealth consists of the sum of the
present values of output streams (gross domestic products), minus the sum of
the present values of taxes and the initial debt commitment. It is noteworthy
that for the individual what matters is the present value of taxes rather than
their precise distribution over time.
Maximizing the utility function (1) subject to the consolidated
constraint (5), the competitive representative consumer is assumed to treat
the market rates of interest (which determine at) as given. Further, since
we assume full certainty and rational expectations, the future rates of
interest as well as taxes and outputs are assumed to be known with perfect
foresight.




As is seen, the rate of consumption in period t is proportional to the value
of wealth in that period with (1—6) being the marginal (and the average)
propensity to consume out of wealth. Thus, in this formulation, the
subjective discount factor, 6,is also the marginal propensity to save out
of wealth. In orderto solve for the value of debt in each period and thereby
gain some insight into the dynamics of debt accumulation, we use equations (6)
and (7) in the budget constraints (2) and obtain
t+1 Y—T
(8) B wt (rt) +
t atOt=O at
-
Equation(8) states that the value of debt in period t must make up for the
difference between the present values (as of period t) of consumption rates
from period zero to period t, [(l_6t4i/at]Wo, and that of disposable
incomes, Io(Yt_Tt)a/at;in addition, the current debt must also
cover payments of the (current value of the) initial debt commitment, Blat.
11.1.3 Government
The government is assumed to spend at the rate Gt. Spending can be
financed by taxes and debt issue at the market rate of interest. Government
behavior, however, is constrained by the solvency requirement according to
which the present value of spending must equal the present value of taxes:
()tt
==oatTt
By substuting equation (9) into the private sector's consolidated budget
constraint we can express the value of wealth, W0, as:—10—
(10)
140= ay — B
where
—G.
Inwhat follows we refer to as output net of government spending.
11.1.4 The Foreign Economy
Individuals in the foreign country are also assumed to have a logarithmic
utility function
(1') = log c
where an asterisk (*) designates variables pertaining to the foreign country.
Individuals in the foreign country are assumed to operate in the same world
capital market as those of the home country and thus they face the same set of








In equation (10') y —i.e.,it denotes the value of
foreign output net of government spending. Finally, it is relevant to note
that, in our two—country world, the home country's debt,—11—
B, appears as the foreign country's asset.
Maximization of the foreign utility function, (1'), subject to the




11.1.5 World Equilibrium and Debt
In our frictionless world, market clearing equilibrium requires that at
each period of time world private sectors' demand far output equals the supply
of world output net of government absorption. Using the consumption functions
(6)—(6') along with (7) and (7') yields:
t **t*
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Since a0= 1we can use (12) for t =0to obtain
(13) (1-a)W0 ÷ (1-o)W0 =
Togain insight into the dynamics of the rates of interest we substitute
for from equation (13) into equation (12) and after some manipulations
we obtain:





Likewise, we substitute for from equation (13) into equation (12) to
obtain:
(1—o)W *t
(14') t =0 —— (o—0 —
yt
Equations (14)—(14' )showthat the present—value factors, a,depend
on three quantities:(i) the levels of the marginal propensities to save,
oand s, (ii) the difference between these saving propensities,
*
a—0, and (iii)thepercentage growth of world output, g. As is seen,
when the marginal propensities to save are equal to each other,
at =ot(1_g).In that case a rise in the saving propensity and a fall
in the growth of output raise the present—value factors, i.e. lower the rates
of—13—
interest since both changes raise world savings at the initial rates of
interest. If world output is stationary, i.e. if =0,the magnitude of
the present—value factors are bounded between 61 and in that case
the rates of interest are bounded between the two countries' subjective rates
of discount.
The solution for W0, W and thesequence of the present value
factors, at, can be obtained from equations (l2)—(l3j and either (10) or
(10'); this latter degree of freedom is due, of course, to Walras Law.









*—*t w¶* *T *tt (1—6){y0[6E0 6A + 6 S0 6 X + (6—6)B}
(17) at= —
wherea =
andwhere denotes the share of foreign product net of government
spending,i.e. analogouslyAt denotes the corresponding share of the
home country, i.e. (y1;/) =1—x.
The requirement that the rates of consumption in both countries are
positive imply that both W0 and 4arepositive. Inspection of
equations (15)—(16) reveals that these requirements imply restrictions on the—14—
initial debt position, B, as well as on the values of A. and At
which reflect the patterns of government spending. These requirements imply
that the value of a in the denominator of equations (15)—(17) is positive
since, when the initial debt position is zero this restriction is necessary to
ensure positive levels of consumption.'° Given that the denominator in
(15)—(17) is positive, the requirement that the initial values of wealth (and
thereby the entire paths of wealth and consumption) are positive also imply a
restriction on the maximal size of the initial value of debt. These
restrictions may be inferred by inspection of the numerators of (l5)—(17). It
may be seen that the maximal size of the initial value of debt in the system
depends positively on the value of world output, and on the marginal
propensities to save, and it also depends on the patterns of fiscal policies.
The dynamics of the system is affected through changes in each country's
debt position. The impact of these changes in debt positions can be analyzed
and interpreted in terms of concepts familiar from the analysis of
international transfers. To obtain insights into the economic factors
governing the dynamics of the system we now turn to an examination of the
effects of a redistribution of the world debt position.
Consider a transfer of assets from the home country to the foreign
country. This transfer amounts to an increase in the value of B which
measures the home country's debt. The impact of the transfer on each
country's consumption and, thereby, on the process of further redistributions
of debt through international transactions depends on its impact on both
countries wealth as well as on the path of world interest rates.








We may conclude that, following a transfer from the home country,
dW/dB >0,dW0/dB < 0, and sign(da/dB) =sign(6*_o).
In interpreting these results consider the effect of the transfer on world
savings at the initial rates of interest. The transfer raises foreign wealth
by dB and lowers domestic wealth by the same amount. Consequently, at the
prevailing rates of interest, world savings change by (6* —6)dB.If 6
> o the transfer induces positive world savings. Restoration of equilibrium
with zero savings requires a fall in the rates of interest so as to discourage
savings and stimulate current consumption through secondary changes in
wealth. The secondary changes in wealth are brought about through the impact
of the changes in the rates of interest on the valuation of wealth. When
> 6the rates of interest must fall, i.e., the values of—the
present—value factor —mustrise as indicated by equation (17). The fall in
the rates of interest raises each country's wealth. The secondary rise in
wealth reinforces the initial effect of the transfer on foreign wealth whereas
it mitigates the loss in wealth to the transferer. These mechanismsare










The preceding analysis of the effect of the transfer on the initial
wealth positions and on the path of the rates of interest provides the
ingredients of the effects of wealth reallocation that occur during the
dynamic processes of the interdependent economies. Specifically, in our world
with no investment, one country's savings must equal the other country1s
dissaving. And the analysis of transfers reveals that if tne marginal saving
propensity of the country which is a net accumulator of assets exceeds that of
the other country, then the subsequent path will be characterized by lower
interest rates (i.e., higher present—value factors), a higher value of the
accumulator's wealth, a lower value of the decumulator's wealth and a higher
value of world's wealth.
Before turning to various comparative statics it is already evident that
in this model fiscal policies affect the equilibrium only through their impact
on net disposable incomes, YtVt —Stand y —
G.Therefore, their impact is equivalent to that of an exogenous change
in gross domestic product.
Since individuals are only concerned with the present value of taxes
which in turn are equal to the present value of government spendings, it
follows that the details of government finance through either taxes or debt
issue do not affect the equilibrium of the system as long as the government
solvency requirements are met.—17—
11.2 THE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICIES
In this section we analyze the effects of fiscal spending in one country
on world rates of interest and on the patterns of consumption in the rest of
the world. The interdependence of private sector's spending on foreign fiscal
spending results from the impact of fiscal policies on the entire path of
rates of interest which, in turn, are connon to both countries. Thus, in this
interdependent world fiscal spending in one country is "financed" by crowding
out of private spending in both countries.
Since private spending depends only on wealth position, it will be
important to examine the impact of government spending on wealth. That impact
in turn will depend on the effect of fiscal policies on disposable incomes as
well as on the time pattern of the rates of interest. Since that pattern
depends on the precise timing of government spending, we will analyze in
detail situations in which changes in government spending are transitory as
well as those in which they are permanent. To avoid repetitive examples we
focus in the subsequent analysis on the impact of fiscal changes in the home
country on world interest rates and on private consumption at home and abroad.
11.2.1 Transitory Changes
Consider the effect of a transitory reduction in domestic fiscal spending
in period s on the rates of interest and on foreign and domestic current
spending. Since consumption is proportional to wealth, we will seek to
determine the effects of fixed spending on the levels of wealth. Suppose
first that the change in fixed spending is expected
to take place in the future (i.e. s0).—18—
To solve for the effect of dy5 on the path of the present—value factors,













We then differentiate the foreign wealth equation (10'), and obtain:
*
dW dcz*t = toY.
Substituting(18) into (19) yields after some manipulations
* *
(20)
Since y0 is given, oomestic and foreign wealth must change in opposite
directions so as to ensure an unchanged value of world consumption in period 0.






Equations (20) and (21) imply therefore that a transitory future
reduction in domestic fiscal spending raises current domestic private
consumption and lowers current foreign consumption. As shown in these—19—
equations, the magnitude of the change in current consumption dependson the
timing of the given fiscal change, as well as on the relative size of thetwo
economies. A given fiscal change that is expected to occur in thedistant
future will have a smaller impact on current consumption thana similar change
that is expected to occur in the near future. This dependence is reflected in
the value ofa5, the present value factor, which diminishes with the
passage of time. Finally, it is noteworthy that the change in world wealth
[(dW0+dw)/dyj depends only on the difference between the two
saving propensities; if 6=6 world wealth remains unchanged.
The solution of the effect of the future transitory fiscal change on the
path of the present—value factors, is completed when we substitute. equation
(20) into (18) (for t =s)and obtain:
da a * * * 11/










Equation (18') shows that a future transitory rise in net output
occurring in period 5, must lower the contemporaneous value ofa5 which
is the relative price of consumption in period s in terms of current
consumption. This change in relative price is necessary to eliminate the
incipient excess supply of goods in period s.—20—
Equation (18'') shows that the effect of the future transitory rise in
net output on the present—value factors in all other periods depend on the
difference between the marginal propensities to save. The interpretation of
this result can be given in terms of the previous analysis of debt transfer.
Here, the rise in domestic wealth and the fall in foreign wealth (arising
from the changes in y5 and a5, imply that, at the prevailing
present—value factors of all other periods (ts) the difference between s
and determines whether world savings are positive or negative and,
therefore, whether must rise or fall.
To explore further the role of timing of the transitory shock suppose
that the reauction in fiscal spending (or equivalently, the rise in net
output) occurs at the present, i.e. s =0.In that case, at the initial
rates of interest, the rise in current domestic output raises domestic wealth
by the same amount and, tnereby, creates an excess supply of current goods.
To restore equilibrium the relative prices of current consumption in terms of
consumptions in all other periods must fall. Equivalently, the present—value
factors, at, must rise. These changes imply that both domestic and foreign






which, together with equation (13) implies that
* *
dW0 1 *) dW0 (1—o )x0
(21')=1- l2) a >0.—21—
Equations (20')—(21') show that a transitory reduction in domestic current
fiscal spending (i.e. a rise in y0) raises the values of current wealth
and thereby the values of private consumption in both countries.
To summarize, it was shown that a future transitory change in fiscal
spending results in opposite changes in current domestic and foreign wealth.
In general, for all periods during which tne fiscal spending remains
unchanged, market clearing requires that world private spending must also
remain unchanged. Therefore, during these periods the fall in foreign wealth
must be accompanied by a rise in domestic wealth. Whether the rates of
interest linking the present period with other periods during which the fiscal
spending remain unchanged, rise or fall, depends on whether the domestic
propensity to save exceeds or falls short of the foreign savings propensity.
In contrast, during the period in which the fiscal change takes place,
market clearing requires that the change in world private consumption must
equal in (opposite sign) the change in government spending. The mechanism
whicfl brings about the necessary changes in private spending operates through
changes in the rates of interest. For example a current transitory reduction
in domestic fiscal spending creates, at prevailing interest rates, domestic
(and therefore world) excess supply of present goods which is eliminated by a
fall in interest rates linking the present period with the period during which
the reduction in fiscal spending occurs. This fall in interest rates raises
foreign and domestic wealth and serves to stimulate both domestic and foreign
current private consumption. Thus, during the period in which the transitory
fiscal changes occur, domestic and foreign wealth must move in the same—22—
direction. The complex changes in the paths of the rates of interest are
reflected in complicated alterations of the term sticucture of interest rates.
11.2.2 Permanent Changes
Consider now the effects of a permanent reduction in domestic fiscal
spending on foreign and domestic private consumption. The effects of the
permanent change on the current value of wealth can be computed from the
previous expressions. For example, the effect of a permanent change in fiscal
spending (dy) on foreign wealth is equivalent to the sum of the effects of
all current (dy0) and future transitory changes (dy5) of equal
magnitudes. Thus, adding (201) to the sum of the expressions in (20) for
t =1,2,...,yields the effect of an equivalent permanent change, as in (22).
** * t *
dWdW dW Y÷_(6—a4jA
"22' =. + ç — b—s
/ dydy0 Ltldyt_
a
* t The sign of dW0/d,y depends on the relations between and
which, as shown by equation (14) depends on the relation between the two
countries' saving propensities and on the rate of growth of world output net
of government absorption.Specifically, for the stationary case with =
0,6 exceedsatif6 exceeds C.Inthat case a permanent rise in
y raises the current value of foreign wealth, and vice versa. On the other
hand, when tne saving propensities are equal to each other (i.e., when
=a),the permanent change in y alters foreign wealth only if g 0.
Thus when =a,dW/dy is positive if world output (net of
government absorption) exhibits positive growth, and vice versa.—23—
We now turn to examine the effect of the permanent change in domestic
fiscal spending on the current value of domestic wealth. Differentiating
equation (13) and using equation (22) yields
*— *4- *
dW 1 1—6 —6 A
(23)
Analogously to the previous discussion, the sign of dW0/dy seems to depend
*t
onthesignof at—6
Furtherinsight, is obtained, however, in the stationary case when =0.






where'i,o denotes the share of the home country's consumption (in period 0)
in world output (net of government absorption), i.e., 4wJ(1—6)Wo/V c 1.
Equation (24) demonstrates that a permanent rise in y must raise domestic
wealth.
The effect of the permanent fall in domestic fiscal spending (i.e., a
permanent rise in net output) on the rates of interest can be ascertained from
the effect of this cnange on world savings at the prevailing rates of
interest. The rise in net domestic output changes current domestic savings
by [dy0 —(1—o)dW0].In the stationary case, with the prevailing rates
of interest, the percentage change in domestic output, dy0/y0
equals the percentage change in domestic wealth dW0/W0. In that case the
incipient change in domestic savings is [y0—(1—o)W0] ,where—24—
the term in the brackets measures the initial value of domestic savings.
Clearly at the prevailing rates of interest, foreign savings do not change.
P.s is evident, the initial value of domestic savings is positive if the
domestic marginal propensity to save exceeds the foreign propensity, i.e. if
*
o .s(in that case equilibrium requires that initially foreign savings
*
werenegative). Conversely, if o <o,domesticsavings were negative.
Thus, the permanent fall in domestic fiscal spending (the rise in y), raises
world savings and induces a fall in the rates of interest if o 6*, and
vice versa.
In tne preceding discussion we examined the effects of fiscal policies in
the home country on the domestic and foreign levels of wealth and consumption
as well as on the path of the world rates of interest. We assumed a
single—commodity world or, equivalently, we assumed that the temporal relative
price of goods was constant. This constancy permitted the construction of a
single composite commodity, and resulted in an international transmission
mechanism in which the intertemporal prices (the rates of interest) played the
exclusive role. The subsequent section extends the analysis by incorporating
the role of the temporal terms of trade.
III. TWO—COMMODITY WORLD
The analysis in Section II was confined to a world with a single
composite commodity. In that world, therefore, the only relevant relative
price was that of consumption in different periods, i.e. the rate of
interest. In this section we extend the model so as to allow for two—25—
different commodities. Therefore, in addition to the intertemporal terms of
trade, the extended model also incorporates the role of the more conventional
terms of trade, i.e. the relative price of importables in terms of exportables.
111.1 The Analytical Framework and World Equilibrium
Let the home country exportable good be denoted by x and its importable
good by m. To simplify the analysis assume that each country is completely
specialized in production. Thus good x is only produced in the home country
at the levelX and good m is only produced in the foreign country at the
level M. Consumers on the other hand are assumed to consume both goods but
since tastes may differ across countries, consumption patterns may differ.
More formally, the expanded menu of goods is now incorporated into the utility
function (1) by noting thatct in (1) is a composite good which is defined
as a Cobb—Douglas function of its components. Specifically
(1') U = log c
where
log c slog cxt ÷ (1—s)log
In order to specify the budget constraint it is convenient to define current
private expenditure by z where
Scxt
+Ptct—26—
thus, z measures private spending in units of good x in period t and
Pt denotes the relative price of good min terms of good x. Government
spending also falls on both goods; Gxt denotes government spending on x
and Gt denotes government spending on m. Thus, the private sector's
constraint, analogous to (5) becomes
(5') 0az =oUt[Xt_(Gxt+PtGmt)]
—B.
In equation (5'), the right hand side defines the value of wealth in
period 0. Equation (5') also incorporates the government budget constraint
according to which the present value of government spending equals the present
value of taxes.
Maximization of the utility function (1') subject to the budget
constraint (5') yields the spending function z which is analogous to the




Equations (6' )—(7' )determinesthe pattern of interternporal spending. In the
present two—good world, individuals also need to determine the temporal







As usual, the marginal propensities to spend on each good,sand 1—8
respectively, are the exponents of the Cobb—Douglas composite good c.
Before turning to the analysis of equilibrium it is relevant to emphasize
that 6 measures the marginal propensity to save out of wealth whereas 8
measures the marginal propensity to consume good x out of spending. In this
framework as in the previous section, behavior is governed by permanent income
(wealth) and the effect of current income in governing current behavior is
only indirect.
The foreign country is modelled in an analogous fashion. Output in the
foreign country is Mt, and the government is assumed to purchase
of good x (which is imported from the home country) and
6mt of good m. The maximization problem is subjected to the private
sector's initial wealtfl, and its solution yields the saving
propensity, 6 ,andthe marginal consumption propensities, 6and
*
(1—a).
Inorder to facilitate tne analysis of comparative statics we define
as domestic product net of the home country's government spending on
domestic product, and as the foreign product net of the foreign




The equilibrium conditions are analogous to those in Section IIexcept
that, in the present expanded framework, equilibrium requires that the world
market for each good clears. Using the demand functions the equilibrium
conditions for both goods are:
t *t
(26) S(16)!4Jo +s(1—o)-—-—W =x—
t
t *.*t*
(27) (1—s)(1—6)-—--— W0 +(1_s*)(1....6-——
W0
=ni — Gm







(29) (1—8)(1—o)—-— +(1—6)(1—o )—= m—G
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As before, by Walras Law, we may ignore one of the equations in the system.
Inspection of the equilibrium conditions (26)—(31) reveals that the
relevant exogenous variables are x, and 6mt given the—29—
values of these variables the full solution can be obtained. This observation
also suggests the particular channel through which government spending
influences world equilibrium. Specifically, it is evident that government
spending on goods produced in its own country exerts an identical effect on
the equilibrium as an equivalent change in the level of domestic production of
that good. Thus, a given rise in x yields tne same effect whether it is
caused by a rise in the level of production, X, or by a fall in
government spending on that good Gxt Further, in this two—good world the
composition of government spending is crucial for the characteristics of world
equilibrium. A given change in the total level of government spending affects
world interest rates in a manner analogous to that of the one—good world. The
key source for the interest—rate effect is that, in contrast with the
government, which is essentially a zero saver, the private sector may either
save or dissave parts of its income. Here, in addition to the interest rate
effect, the composition of government spending also influences the relative
price of the two gooas since the pattern of government spending may differ
from that of the private sector. Therefore, a given rise in Gt may exert
a different influence on world equilibrium than a rise in of equal
value.
An explicit solution of the full system (26)—(3l) is cumbersome.In
order to highlight the key economic factors that affect the equilibrium, we
now turn to a simplified version of the model. We assume that the paths of
outputs and governments spending are stationary. Thus, let x =x,mt =
m, = andGmt =Gmby substituting these stationary
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The explicit solution for p0 can be obtained by substituting (33) for
into (34).
To gain insight into the determinants of p0 we note that the
equilibrium price must equate one country's trade balance surplus with the
other's trade deficit or equivalently, the equilibrium price must ensure that
the value of worldspending on goods equals the value of world output. Thus,








where the left—hand—side of (35) measures the home country's trade balance
deficit and the right—hand—side measures the foreign country's trade balance
surplus. To ensure that the market for each good clears we use equation (28)
and substitute for into (35). The solution for p0 yields equation
(34).—31—
111.2. The Impact of Debt Redistribution
The equilibrium of the system described in section 111.1 was conditional
on the prevailing allocation of debt, and, as before, the dynamics of the
system is effected through changes in each country's debt position. Like in
the one—good world, the dynamic process may be associated with changes in
interest, rates, depending on the effect of debt redistribution on world
savings. In the two—goods. world the dynamic process may also be associated
with changes in relative prices, depending on the effect of debt
redistribution on excess demands for goods. When such changes in relative
prices occur the impact of changes in real rates of interest on wealth and
thereby on consumption also depends on the path of relative prices. In this
section we deal with these issues.
Consider first the impact of a transfer of assets from the home to the
foreign country. From equations (32)—(33) we note that the rise in the value
of B raises foreign wealth by a factor proportional to $(]._6)(m_Gm) and
lowers domestic wealth by a factor proportional to 8 (1—6 )(m_Gm).
These changes in wealth alter the demand for goods, and, as seen from
equations (32) and (34), induce a change in tne relative price. The direction
of the change in the relative price depends on the sign of (_*)•Thus,
conforming with the well—known transfer problem criterion, a redistribution of
wealth towards the foreign country raises the relative price of foreign goods
* if(1—8 ),theforeign marginal propensity to spend on these goods, exceeds
(1—a), the home country's marginal propensity to spend on foreign goods or,
equivalently, if a >a.—32—
To determine the effect of tne transfer on real consumption in the
presence of changes in relative prices we need to define a price index which
will then be used for evaluating the real values of consumption and wealth, as
well as in real rates of interest. We define the price index associated with
one unit of the consumption bundle ct as pB and, correspondingly,
the foreign price index is defined as p?_8*. Formally, the domestic
price index is obtained by minimizing the cost cxt +Ptcmtassociated
with obtaining one unit of the consumption bundle the
resulting index is the (utility based) true consumer price index.
Analogously, the foreign price index is obtained by minimizing the cost of
obtaining one unit of the foreign consumption bundle.
Using the price index, the values of real consumption, ct and
* . * 1—B
ct are related to private spendings, ZtandZtaccordingto c =Zt/Pt
** 1_B* *_8 and c =Zt/pt which are also equal to (1—o)Wt/pt ,andto
(l_6*)W*/pl_8* respectively. Therefore, in order to evaluate the impact of debt transfer
on real consumptions we need to evaluate its impact on the values of real
wealth.12 Since the value of real wealth depends on the paths of the
present—value factors and prices, we first examine the impact of the transfer
on the present value factor which expresses the rates of interest in terms of
good x.
Using equations (26), (28) and (32) and assuming that initially
government spendings are zero, the present—value factor measured in terms of
good x can be written
as:
* *t t
— + (1—a)[(1—@)x +(1—o)B](a—a)
at — 41—(1_s)6*—Ba]—33—
As may be seen, the effect of a transfer on xdependson the relation
between 6 and 6*. A rise in B lowers at (i.e., raises the rate of
interest in terms of good x) if 6 > fl.In that case the interest rate
effect of the transfer operates to lower the recipient country's wealth.
To compute the present value—factor in terms of good m we use equations
(27), (32) and (33) and obtain:
(36'
t *t * * *t* t
—(18)x[s*(1_6)6+(1....$*)(16*)6]+(1o )(1—6)[a(1—8 )(o —B (1—8)6 ]B
atpt_
am[1—(1—8)6—86]
As may be seen, the effect of a transfer on atPt depends on the relation
between the propensities to save, 6 and o ,andthe propensities
*
governingthe patterns of spending, sandB .Asis evident, when
=a, thetransfer does not alter the commodity terms of trade and the
effects of the transfer depend only on the relation between the marginal
propensities to save. In that case the present value factors in terms of x
and m move in the same direction.
Having examined all the ingredients of the real values of wealth, we now
turn to examine the effects of the transfer on the real values of consumption
starting with the receiving country's consumption. Using equations (32) and
(34) it is shown in Appendix II that around an initial equilibrium with zero








An examination of (37) reveals that when s= 8*,i.e., when a transfer
does not alter the commodity terms of trade, then a r_2ceipt of a transfer must
raise real consumption. In this case, all goods may be aggregated into a
single composite commodity and tfle analysis reduces to that of the
one—commodity world of Section II. Likewise, when= , i.e.,when a
transfer at the initial terms of trade does not alter world savings, then a
receipt of a transfer will also necessitate a rise in real consumption. In
this case expenditures must equal income in each country so as to eliminate
intertemporal trade. Thus, this case corresponds to the traditional static
transfer problem analysis where it is known that a receipt of a transfer must
raise real consumption. In the general case both8 S and fl,and the
transfer alters the commodity terms of trade ——thetemporal relative price of
goods ——andthe rates of interest —theintertemporal terms of trade. It is
noteworthy, however, that even in cases for which the transfer results in a
higher consumer price index and in higher rates of interest (measured in terms
of good x) the value of the receiving country's real wealth must rise along
with the value of its real consumption.13
We now turn to examine the effect of the transfer on the value of the
paying country1s real consumption. Using equations (32)—(34) it is also shown
in Appendix II that around the initial equilibrium with zero government
spendings and zero initial debt:
dlogc * *




Analogously to the analysis of the effect of the transfer on the
receiving country's consumption, it can be shown that independent of the
configurations of 8, 6 and 6, d log c0/dS <0.Thus, even if
the payment of the transfer results in a lower price index and lower rates of
interest, which tend to raise the real value of wealth, the net result must be
a reduced level of real consumption.
The preceding analysis determined the effect of a change in debt on the
initial levels of real consumption in both countries (each in terms of its own
price index). In that discussion the cause for the change in debt was an
exogenous transfer. In general, however, the international reallocation of
debt results from the dynamic processes which characterize each country's
income—spending decisions and which are reconciled through the equilibrium
condition that world savings must be zero. The expressions in equations (37)
and (38) can also be used to determine at each point the impact of current
account surpluses and deficits (i.e. of changes in debt holdings) on the
current levels of real consumption. Since from (7')Wt =(6t/a)w0
* •*t *
and =(o/at)Wo. it follows that whether the home country
accumulates or decumulates wealth, i.e. whether its debt falls or rises,
depends on whether rises or falls with the passage of time. As may
be seen from equation (36), over time the home country's debt increases and
the foreign country's debt decreases if 6 >aand vice versa. It
follows, therefore, that over time the home country's real consumption falls
and the foreign country's real consumption rises.—36—
111.3. The Effects of Fiscal Policies
In this section we analyze the effects of fiscal spending on the patterns
of consumption in the various countries. The two—good world contains
additional channels of interdependence that were not present in the one—good
world of Section II. Since the relative prices of goods reflect the pattern
of spending in both countries, the analysis of fiscal policies needs to
specify the spending patterns of the government. In general it will be seen
that the impact of policies depends on relations between various behavioral
propensities. Specifically, the key factors determining the outcomes of
policies are differences among the spending patterns and the saving
propensities of four groups: foreign and domestic private sectors as well as
foreign and domestic governments. These differences govern the evolution of
relative prices and rates of interest following fiscal changes.
In order to avoid tedious derivations we will focus in this section on
the effects of permanent fiscal policies by the home country. Since the
effects of fiscal policies depend on the patterns of government spending, we
will consider the cases in which spending falls on domestic goods and those in
which it falls on foreign goods. In these cases we will examine the effects
of the policies on the values of real consumption at home and abroad which, to
recall, are defined as:
=(1_6)Wt/p
and
* * * 1_e*
ct =(1—6)Wt/pt—37—
Using equations (32)—(34) it is shown in Appendix III that the
logarithmic derivatives of real corisumptions with respect to changes in
government spending on domestic goods, G, and on foreign goods, G1
evaluated around an initial equilibrium with zero government spendings and
zero initial debt are:
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Asmay be seen, a rise in fiscal spending on domestic goods lowers the
values of real consumption at home and abroad. The reduction in foreign
consumption thus "finances" part of the increased government spending. The
proportional reduction in foreign real consumptions is 8*, i.e., the
relative snare of foreign spending on good x. Analogously, the proportional—38—
reduction in the home country's private sector's real consumption is .
Thus,when the home country's government increases spending on the domestic
good the extent of the reduction in the values of real consumptions of the
private sectors in both countries depends on the importance of that good in
private sectors' budgets. The precise effects of a rise in government
spending on foreign goods depends on the magnitudes of the various
propensities as may be seen from equations (40) and (42).
In order to highlight the role of the government's spending propensities
we define the government spending function G as:
(43) G
and we assume that the government spending propensities are on good
x, and (1—SG) on good m. Thus:
Gx = andPGm =
whichimplies that, formally, 6m becomes a function of G,, c3m =




Usingthis specification of government spending we note that
* * *




To obtain insights into the economic factors which are at play, we now
turn to examine some special cases. These cases correspond to specific
assumptions about some of the marginal propensities. We start with the case
in which the domestic and foreign marginal propensities to save are the same,
i.e.,6 =6*.In that case using equations (39)—(40) and the specification
of government spending which is embodied in (45) along with the solution for









Equation(46) reveals that when 6 =6*the effect of domestic fiscal
spending on foreign real consumption depends only on differences among the
patterns of spending of domestic private and public
:t0r5 68G'
as well
as between domestic and foreign private sectors, —s .Theeconomic
interpretation of this result is as follows. When 6—6we know from
equation (36) that in both countries the interest rate equals the subjective
discount rate. Therefore, in each country savings are zero. In that case,
neither the rates of interest, nor the total level of world spending are
altered in response to government spending since the government, like the
private sectors, is a zero saver. It follows that the potential effect of
fiscal policies can only operate through changes in relative prices. In
conformity with the standard analysis of economic transfers, such changes can
occur only if the spending patterns differ among private and public sectors.
To demonstrate the role of the spending patterns consider the following
special cases:—40-S
(i) When all spending patterns are identical, i.e., when 8=8 = we
note from equation (46) that dlog c0/dG =0.Thus, in this special
case, the effects of fiscal policy are not transmitted internationally
and only the domestic private sector is crowded out.In that case
aggregate behavior in the various markets are not affected by the fiscal
policy and, therefore, there are no changes in relative prices.
(ii) When the spending patterns of the domestic and foreign private sectors
are identical, i.e. when 8=8, we note from equation (46) that the
direction of the change in foreign real consumption following a rise in
domestic fiscal spending depends only on the difference between s, the
private sectors1 spending pattern, and 613. tne corresponding
government spending pattern. If a >8Qa rise in government spending
creates an excess supply of good x and an excess demand for good m at
the initial relative price. Equilibrium is restored through a rise in
p, the relative price of good m. This rise in p raises the real
value of foreign wealth and, thereby, raises real consumption. The
preceding discussion also implies that in the extreme case in which
813 =1,i.e., when government spending falls entirely on good x,
foreign real consumption must fall (as was already shown in equation
(39)). At the other extreme, when $13 =0,i.e., when government
spending falls entirely on good m, (the case which corresponds to
equation (40)), the value of foreign real consumption must rise.
The effect of the rise in government spending on the home country1s real
consumption must always be negative independent of the patterns of government—41—
spending. Thus, in conformity with the traditional results of economic
transfers, the secondary yam that might occur tnrough an improvement of the
terms of trade cannot offset the primary loss which in the present case is the
tax levied to finance government spending.
The preceding analysis was confined to the case in which each country's
income equalea its spending since 6 was assumed to equal 6. As a
result, the international transmission of fiscal policies operated entirely
through the effects of thesepolicies on the relative price of goods without
any impact on the rates of interest. We turn now to examine the case in which
the saving propensities differ, i.e. 6 6*.In order to isolate the
effects of differences between private and public spending patterns we will





ifthe denominator of the second ratio on the right—hand—side of (46') is
positive and vice versa. As may be seen, the sign in (46') depends on the
relation between the spending patterns of the private sectors and the
government, B and 6G' as well as on the relation between the saving







In that case the patterns of world spending on goods are independent of fiscal
policies since 8 =B=8 Therefore the two goods can be aggregated
into a composite commodity and the analysis reduces to that of the one—good
world. And, as seen in equation (46") the key factor determining the effect
of fiscal spending on foreign real consumption is the relation between
and 6. Analogously to the analysis of equation (22) (where we analyzed the
effect of a rise in output net of government absorption), the interpretation
of this result is in terms of the effect of government spending on the rate of
interest. If 6 > 6, the foreign country saves part of its income whereas
the domestic economy dissaves; thus the domestic country's marginal
propensity to save out of income is negative.In that case, a rise in the
home country's government spending amounts to transferring income from a
dissaver (the home country's private sector) to a zero saver (the government),
and, thereby creating (at the prevailing rates of interest) excess world
savings. To restore equilibrium the rates of interest must fall. The fall in
the rates of interet raises foreign wealth and real consumption. The
opposite occurs when 6* < a.In that case government spending lowers world
savings and raises interest rates and, thereby, lowers foreign wealth and real
consumption. In that case, the effect of government spending on the home
country's real consumption is always negative and the analysis is analogous to
that of the one—commodity world equation (24). As usual, the secondary gain
*
arisingfrom a fall in the rate of interest (that occurs when 6> a)
cannot outweigh the primary loss from the tax that is levied to finance
government spending.—43—
The preceding analysis focused on the nature of the international
transmission of domestic fiscal policies. One of the central mechanisms
through wflich the transmission is effected operates through the effects of
fiscal spending on real rates of interest. In what follows we elaborate on
the effects of fiscal policies on the real rates of interest.
The example underlying equation (46'') assumes that the patterns of
spending are identical among domestic and foreign governments and private
sectors. The assumption that implies that the real rates of interest
are equal across countries. The additional assumption that s=s implies
that the effects of changes in fiscal spending on the real rates of interest
depend only on the differences between the domestic and the foreign saving
propensities.
The example underlying equation (46'), assumes that the spending patterns
of the domestic and foreign private sectors differ from those of the
government, i.e. that G 8 =8*.In that case real rates of interest
are equal across the world but the impact on the real rates of government
spending depend not only on tne relation between the two countries' saving
propensities but also on tfle relation between a and In the more
general case for which all spending patterns differ, real rates of interest
differ across countries and the effect of government spending on these rates
is more complex.
To illustrate, consider the special case in which government spending
falls entirely on the domestically produced good, i.e. =1.The
effects of government spending on the real rates of interest can be computed
from their effects on the present—value factors measured in terms of the
consumption baskets. The aomestic and foreign real present—value factors are











Thus,a reduction in government spending G (i.e. a rise in x) lowers the
real present—value factors in both countries and raises the corresponding real
rates of interest. In contrast with the case of equality among private and
public spending patterns in which the direction of changes in real rates of
interest depended on the relation between saving propensities, here these
propensities play no role. In the present case with =1domestic and
foreign real rates of interest move in the same direction. The extent of
their response to fiscal changes depends on the relative share of the good
which is not consumed by the government (good m) in private sector's spending.
In the intermediate case for which government spending falls on both
goods but the relative share exceeds the corresponding shares of the
private sectors, aand theeffect of government spending on the real
rates of interest reflects the influence of both spending patterns and saving
propensities. For example, if 6 >6a reduction in government spending
lowers world savings (as shown in Section II) and thereby reinforces the
effects embodied in equations (47)—(47'). On the other hand, ifo c
the impact of government spending on world savings and, thereby, on the real
rates of interest tends to mitigate and may reverse the effects operating via
equations (47)—(47').
We have shown in this section that the effects of government spending on
world rates of interest and the nature of the international transmission
mechanism depend on the multitude of "transfer problem criteria". These—45—
includethe relations between saving propensities and spending patterns of
domestic and foreign governments and private sectors.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we attempted to analyze the relation between government
spending and real rates of interest as well as the international transmission
of fiscal policies. Specifically, we examined the dependence of the patterns
of consumption in one country on fiscal policies in the rest of the world.
For this purpose we developed a general equilibrium model which was
cnaracterized by fully integrated world capital markets. Econofflic agents were
assumed to behave rationally and government policies were constrained to obey
the interteniporal solvency requirement.
We demonstrated that the effects of changes in countries' net debtor
position as well as the effect of fiscal policies can be analyzed by reference
to a multitude of "transfer problem criteria", which are familiar from the
theory of international economic transfers. In the present case the impact of
policies depended on comparisons among the patterns of domestic and foreign
private sectors' and government spending as well as between domestic and
foreign saving propensities.
For example, we showed that when spending patterns are similar across
countries, the effect of a permanent rise in government spending on the rate of
interest depends on whether the country in question is a saver or a dissaver
in the world economy. If the country is a dissaver a rise in government
spending lowers domestic consumption and rates of interest and induces a rise—46—
in foreign wealth and consumption. Thus, transmission in that case is
positive. The opposite holds when the country is a netsaver.In the more
general case the exact nature of the transmission and of the effect of
government spending on interest rates depends also on comparisons among the
various spending patterns which, in turn, determine the impact of fiscal
policies on the terms of trade. The impact of permanent fiscal policies on
the rates of interest and, thereby, on the nature of the transmission
mechanism also depends on the percentage growth of world net output.
Specifically, the rates of interest which result from expansionary fiscal
policies tend to be higher, and the international transmission tends to be
more negative, the faster is the percentage growth of world output.
Our analysis also draws a distinction between permanent and transitory
policies as well as between current policies and expected future policies.It
was shown that a transitory current fiscal spending, in addition to crowding
out the domestic private sector, must also crowd out the foreign private
sector and, thereby, result in a negative transmission. However, a transitory
future rise in government spending must induce an immediate increase in
foreign private sector's consumption and thereby result in a positive current
transmission. In both cases, of course, domestic private sector's consumption
must fall. These patterns of response reflect themselves in the current
account of the balance—of—payments and in changes in the various countries'
net debtor—creditor positions.
The distinction between permanent and transitory policies also reflects
itself in complex changes in the term structure of interest rates. For
example, it was shown that a future transitory fiscal expansion lowers the-47-
rate of interest linking tne present period with the period during which the
transitory fiscal change occurs. The impact on the rates of interest linking
the present period with all other periods depends on the difference between
domestic and foreign marginal propensities to save. In contrast, it was shown
that a transitory current rise in fiscal spending must raise the rates of
interest pertaining to all maturities. The rise in short—term rates of
interest exceeds the rise in long—term rates and, thereby, the slope of the
yield curve is lowered.
The analysis of the impact of fiscal policies on real rates of interest
revealed that even when capital markets are highly integrated, real rates of
interest may differ if spending patterns differ across countries. With such
differences in spending patterns, fiscal policies exert different quantitative
effects on real rates of interest in the various countries. In the presence
of non—traded goods, fiscal policies may also exert different qualitative
effects on real rates of interest in different countries since, depending on
the nature of the transmission mechanism and on the patterns of government and
private sectors' spending, the relative prices of non—traded goods, and
thereby the price indices, might be negatively correlated between countries.
Under these circumstances it might be preferable to test for the degree of
integration of international financial capital markets by reference to tests
of covered interest arbitrage rather than by direct comparisons of aggregate
real rates of interest.
The examination of the response to future changes is applicable to the
analysis of the impact of the discovery of North—Sea oil. That discovery
changes current wealth, but its impact on the actual flow of oil is expected—48—
to occur only in the future. The rise in current wealth stimulates
consumption and is observed to induce a process of de—industrialization, as
resources move from manufactures to services ——aprocess referred to as the
"Dutch Disease". General equilibrium considerations, such as those
incorporated in our analysis suggest that the "Dutch Disease" in the oil
discovering country is accompanied by an opposite process, namely, an
industrialization process, in the rest of the world. The channel of
transmission in that case is the rise in world interest rates induced by the
oil discovery.
Our analysis is subject to several limitations which stem from some of
the simplifying assumptions. We assumed that the output levels were given
exogeneously. An extension would allow for a process of investment which
responds to rates of interest and which changes the paths of outputs. Such an
extention would modify the pattern of the current account and debt
accumulation.'4 The endogeneity of output could also be introduced through
the incorporation of some Keynesian features such as price rigidities. Under
such circumstances government spending would alter the level of economic
activity and would be transmitted internationally through the mechanisms
similar to those of the foreign—trade multipliers.
Further extension would modify the assumption of full certainty. The
incorporation of uncertainty might raise additional issues such as the role of
bankruptcy and default. In that case, a relevant question would be the impact
of fiscal policies on the likelihood of bankruptcies and defaults in the
international capital markets.—49—
One of the key features of our model has been the central role played by
the path of government spending and the irrelevancy of the path of government
budget deficits. One of the reasons responsible for this feature was the
assumption that all taxes were of the non—distorting variety. As a result
the time pattern of taxes and government debt issue was irrelevant once the
pattern of government spending was given. An extension would allow far
distorting effects of taxes.14 Such distortions would introduce new
considerations associated with the determination of the optimal paths of the
various means of government finance.
Finally, our two—country world with exogenous government spendings
enables exploitation of monopoly.-monopsony powers in goods and capital
markets. An extension would determine the optimal pattern of government
spending along with the optimal trade—cum—capital—flows tax structure along
the lines of the optimal tariff literature. Such a strategic behavior could
then be incorporated into a more elaborate game—theoretic world equilibrium.
In such a set—up, government spendings and its means of finance would become
endogenous variables that are determined in the context of world equilibrium.—50—
APPENDIX
THE TWO—COMMODITY STATIONARY SYSTEM
I. The Solution of the System
The solutions of the system for the stationary case can be obtained as
follows. We first express the definitions of wealth in equations (30)—(31) as
(A—i) W0 =xt=oat — — B
* — * —
(A—2) W0 =m —
Gxt=oat +.
Substituting(A—1)—(A—2) into (28)—(29) yields:
(A3) s(1_6)LXI;OC —G octPt — B]
** *0 + a(i—6 )[rn t=oatPtx!t=oat +Bj='x—G
(k.4) (1a)(io)[x 1=oCtm1=oatPt_8]
**
+ (i—s)(i— )[m toatPt —6
=
p0(m—G)—51—
We then multiply both sides of (26) by a,sumboth sides over all t
(from 0 to )andsubstitute (A—i) and (A—2) for and W. The
resulting equation is then:
(A—5)oat— Gm=oatPt_B]
+s*[m=o ap —G;a+ B]=
*
= (x_G)toat.
Equation (A—3), (A—4) and (M—5) constitute the relevant system for the case of
stationary outputs and fiscal policies. The economic interpretation of the
equation is as follows: Equations (A—3) and (A—4) describe the equilibrium in
the markets for the two goods in period 0. It is evident that this is a
rational expectations equilibrium since the demand functions are based on the
fully expected realization of future values of rates of interest and prices.
Equation (A—5) requires that the sum of the present values of world demand for
good x equal the corresponding sum of world supply. As may be noted we have
used Walras Law to ignore the analogous requirement for good m.
Using this system we may solve for the three unknowns: The sum of the
present value factors in terms of good x —— a;thesum of the
present value factors in terms of good m — and the
relative price of good m in terms of x in the first period ——p0.These
solutions can then be used in (A—i) and (A—2) to obtain the values of
and W. These are the solutions that are reported in the text.—52—
II. The Effects of Debt on Real Consumptions
In this part of the Appendix we derive the effects of debt transfers on
the real values of domestic and foreign consumptions. These results are
computed around an initial equilibrium with zero debt and zero government
spendings. Around such an equilibrium, the values of W, W and
p0 are (from (32)—(34fl:
—(i—s)x
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d log c/dB =dlog W/dB —(1_.s*)d log p0/dB we may
multiply (A—12) by (1_s*) and use (A—lU) to obtain equation (37) in the text.
The effect of the transfer on domestic real consumption is obtained








Multiplying (A—12) by (1—8) and subtracting from (A—14) yields equation (38)
in the text.
III. The Effects of Fiscal Spending on Real Consumptions
In this part of the Appendix we derive the effects of fiscal policies on
the real values of domestic and foreign consumptions. As before these results
are computed around an initial equilibrium with zero debt and zero government





















To convert (A—H) into a logarithmic derivative we first substitute (A—6)




anddividing (A—19) by (A—20) yields
diog p
dx x
Multiplying (A—21) by (1fl) and subtracting from the logarithmic derivative
of with respect to x (obtained from (A—15) and (A—6)) we get
diog c/dx which is equation (39) in the text, with a minus sign (since
dx =_dGx)—55—
Analogously, dividing (A—17) by (A—i) yields the logarithmic derivative
of with respect to x, from which we subtract the product of (1—s) and
(A—20), to obtain d log c0/dx which is equation (41) in the text (with a
minus sign).
To compute the effects of changes in Gm on real consumptions we first
note that from (34) and (A—15):
(A—22) =(i—a)
2.{i +____________
anddividing by (A—21) yields
d log p0ii÷Rs
(A—23) dG i 1 +
whereR and S are defined in equation (42) in the text. Multiplying
(A—23) by (i_a*) and subtracting from the ratio of (A—16) and (A—6) yields
equation (40) in the text.
Analogously, dividing (A—is) by (A—17) and subtracting the product of
(1—a) and (A—23) yields equation (42) in the text.
IV. The Effects of Fiscal Spending on Real Rates of Interest
In this part of the Appendix we compute the effects of domestic permanent
fiscal spending on domestic and foreign real rates of interest. For
simplicity we focus on the case in which government spending falls entirely on
good x, i.e. the case for which =1.
Equation (26) in text around an initial equiibrium with zero government
spending and initial debt implies that—56—
(A—24) at= l/x[8(l_d)6tW0+





0= *t 6(1—6)6 +
Using(A—17) and (A—7) for diog W0/dx, and using (A—15) and (A—6) for




Analogously,from equation (27) we obtain:
*








— a(1—6)6 0—* t * *
e(1—6)6 +(1—a)(1—o )s
Using (A—17) and (A—7) for diog W0/dx, and using (A—15) and (A—B) for
dlog W0/dx, we obtain after substituting (A—25'):
diog Pt 1
(A—26') dx x—57.-
As may be observed by comparing (A—26') with (A—2l), the effect of x on
the initial price p0 is the same as its effect on the entire path of
prices, misresult reflects the finding in (A—25') where it was shown
that the change of x does not alter the entire path of interest rates.
Finally, logarithmic differentiation of the real present—value factors,
(ap8) and (atpt*) with x, and using (A—25') and
(A—26'), yields equations (47)—(47') in the text.—58—
FOOTNOTES
1.For surveys of some of this literature see Fair (1979) and Mussa (1979)
and the references therein.
2.See Laursen and Metzler (1950) and Harberger (1950).
3. See contributions by Mundell (1968) and Fleming (1962).
4. See Dornbusch (1976) and Frenkel and Rodriguez (1981).
5.See, for example, Mishkin (1983), Huizinga and Mishkin (1981), Mark
(1983) and Cumby and Obstfeld (1984) for studies of real interest rate
equality. On covered interest arbitrage see Frenkel and Levich (1977).
6.For this hypothesis see Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Feldstein
(1983), and for some discussions see Harberger (1980) and Tobin (1983).
7. The basic model of these characteristics is developed in Helpman and
Razin (1982) who study the implications of its monetary counterpart for
the analysis of exchange rate dynamics.
8. On this see Barro (1974).
9. On the role of "transfer problem criteria" see Mussa (1969).
10. As is evident from (15)—(17), the denominator a is always positive if
0 < c1. This statement is obvious when
*
6. When
*6 > 6itis also true since
* * * *_* *t t




where is maximal value of x. The weighted average
[(1—A )is÷x a ]< 1since a and aare smaller than unity. Thus—59—
alsoin this case the value of a is positive. The only problem may
arise if, for some periods, government spending exceeds gross domestic
product so as to result in values of that either exceed one or are
negative. In that case we impose the requirement that the values of
wealth are positive.
11. Equation (18') must be negative for considerations similar to those in
footnote 10.
12.In genera], to determine the effect of a transfer on the real value of
consumption in terms of the consumer price index, we need to determine
the change in the real value of wealth as well as in the real interest
rate (in terms of the consumer consumption bundle). In the present case,
however, since we have used logarithmic utility function, the marginal
saving propensity is independent of the rate of interest and, therefore,
the entire effect of transfers and other policies on real consumption
operate through their effects on real wealth.
13. This result follows by noting that the denominator in equation (37) is
positive, and the minimal value of the numerator cannot fall below a
positive number.
14. For an analysis of the role of investment in determining the path of the
current account see Sachs (1981).
15. For an analysis of these effects see Barro (1979), Kydland and Prescott
(1976) and Razin and Svensson (1983).—60—
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